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STATUTORY ADOPTION OF SEVERAL LIABILITY IN
NEW MEXICO: A COMMENTARY AND
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE HISTORY1
ANDREW G. SCHULTZ* and M. E. OCCHIALINO**

I. INTRODUCTION
The 1987 Legislature adopted a statute incorporating the doctrine of several
liability into the law of New Mexico. 2 No official legislative history of the
adoption of the statute exists and this article does not memorialize the intent of
the lawmakers who adopted the several liability statute. Instead, the article
presents a statement of the goals of the drafters and an informal record of the
process by which Senate Bill 164 progressed through many drafts to become
Chapter 141 of the Laws of 1987. The authors are but two of the many persons
who participated in the drafting process;3 thus, they cannot present a definitive
statement of the goals of each drafter of the statute. 4 Nonetheless, the authors
offer this commentary in the hope that it will assist the courts in the construction
of the statute's terms5 and will aid attorneys in an understanding of its workings.
II. BACKGROUND
The New Mexico judiciary often changes the common law of torts as conditions
warrant.6 The Legislature usually is content to leave this process of modifying
tort law in the courts' hands. The Legislature has chosen to act only when a
*B.A., Swarthmore College, 1979; M.S., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1981; J.D., University of New
Mexico School of Law, 1984; Associate, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
**B.A., Siena College, 1964; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1967; Keleher & McLeod Professor
of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
I. Both the title and the thought that the article may be of use to the bench and bar are derived from
Anne Bingaman's valuable article, The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and QuasiLegislative History, 5 N.M.L. REv. I (1974).
2. 1987 N.M. Laws ch. 141. The portion of the statute addressing several liability is codified at N.M.
STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I (Supp. 1987) (hereinafter "Article 3A"). The section modifying the definition of
"pro rata" shares in contribution is codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3-2 (Supp. 1987). The provision
dealing with the diminishment of an employer's right to reimbursement for benefits paid to an injured
worker is codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). Chapter 141 is reproduced in
Appendix A.
3. Southwest Community Health Services retained Mr. Schultz to assist in the development of a several
liability statute. Professor Occhialino participated in the drafting process at the request of the New Mexico
Trial Lawyers Association. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of any other persons.
4. Others who participated in the drafting process were: Michael Browde, Stephen Durkovich, Bruce
Hall, Tom Horan, Peter Mallory, R.E. Thompson and Terry Word.
5. "In determining legislative intent, the Court will look primarily to the language used, yet may also
consider the history and background of the statute in question." First Nat'l Bank of Santa Fe v. Southwest
Yacht & Marine Supply Corp., 101 N.M. 431, 435, 684 P.2d 517, 521 (1984).
6. "New Mexico's appellate courts in a number of cases, have declined to adhere to ancient common
law doctrines when those doctrines became out of tune with today's society." Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M.
625, 629, 651 P.2d 1269, 1273 (1982); e.g., Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
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perceived crisis in tort law demanded a comprehensive solution, 7 or when the
Legislature disagreed with and wished to modify a tort doctrine declared by the
courts! s Passage of Chapter 141 marks a departure from this pattern of legislative
intervention in the common law development of tort doctrine. The statute neither
addresses a comprehensive subject nor, with a single exception, 9 does it veto or
modify a decision of the courts. Instead, the statute ratifies the 1982 decision
of the court of appeals in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., " which
adopted the doctrine of several liability, and enshrines that doctrine as part of
the statutory law of New Mexico.
The Legislature's reasons for intervening to affirm rather than to undo a
judicially-created tort doctrine are unknown, as are the motives of those who
proposed the statute, but a possible rationale can be divined. The court of appeals
adopted several liability in Bartlett," and the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to review this decision. 2 More than one year later, the supreme court
finally signalled its approval of Bartlett, but only in dictum."' Moreover, by
1987, three of the five supreme court justices who indicated their approval of
Bartlett had left the bench. 4
Those favoring several liability may have perceived that Bartlett could be
vulnerable to overruling and that a statute incorporating the doctrine of several
liability would negate this possibility. Opponents of several liability may have
been less certain that the supreme court would undo Bartlett. They may have
been willing to affirm several liability in a statute in return for statutory resolution
of certain sub-issues raised by the adoption of several liability, and thus to avoid
the uncertainty and cost that case-by-case development of the law entails. Where
unresolvable disagreements arose, both sides may have preferred an incomplete
statute, which leaves these disputed issues to the courts, rather than no statute
at all.
The content of Chapter 141 is consistent with such speculations. The statute
first enshrines the doctrine of several liability as the general rule in New Mexico. 5
It also provides exceptions to several liability that had not been ruled on yet by
the courts,' 6 and provides that the courts may develop other exceptions to this
doctrine.' 7 Chapter 141 then addresses other issues. It incorporates prior law"
concerning the effect of settlement by one tortfeasor on the liability of others, 9
but changes previous law2" concerning employers' rights to reimbursement in
7. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (Tort Claims Act); id. §415-1 to 41-5-28 (Medical Malpractice Act).
8. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (Dram Shop Act).
9. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
10. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
II. Id.
12. 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
13. Taylor v. Delgamo Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
14. Chief Justice Payne, Justice Riordan and Justice Federici participated in Taylor, see id., but no
longer are on the bench.
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1987).
16. Id. §41-3A-1(C).
17. Id. §41-3A-1(C)(4).
18. Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d
308 (1983).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(E) (Supp. 1987).
20. Taylor, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445.
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several liability cases in which workers sue third-party tortfeasors. 2' Next, the
statute resolves the issue of the application of several liability where multiple
tortfeasors cause separate injuries. 22 Finally, it modifies the prior statutory law
of
to incorporate
principles
comparative
fault intoto those
4
in contribution
which joint liability,
rather than
several ofliability,
will continue
apply.2cases
Ill. SEVERAL LIABILITY DEFINED
In Bartlett, the court of appeals adopted several liability without carefully
defining the term. Section I(B) of Article 3A defines several liability in a manner
consistent with its usage in Bartlett25 and in the Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI)
which embodies the Bartlett decision.26
The statute provides:
In causes of action to which several liability applies, any defendant who
establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injury shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault
to the total fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants
and persons not party to the action.27
Consistent with the current UJI, the statute authorizes the jury to consider the
fault of both parties and non-parties to the action.28 Fault which does not conN.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(D) (Supp. 1987).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3-2(D) (Supp. 1987).
In Bartlett, the court of appeals ordered that the trial court enter judgment in accordance with the
verdict which had been rendered on the basis of the following instruction:
If you find for the plaintiff but also find that the negligence of the plaintiff and/or the
unknown third party contributed to cause the accident and resulting damages, then you
must decide how much each party was at fault. The defendant is liable only for defendant's
percentage of fault in causing the accident and any resulting damages and the total
amount of damages to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled shall be reduced in
proportion to the percentage of plaintiff's negligence and/or the negligence of the unknown third party.
98 N.M. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580.
26.
If you find that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by a combination of negligence of more than one person, you must determine the amount of damages to be
awarded as follows:
First: In accordance with the damage instructions I have given you, determine the
total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
jury's

Second: Compare the negligence, if any, of Iplaintiff(s) Ibeneficiary(ies)l land] Idefendant(s)] land] Inon-partiesl and determine a percentage for each. The percentage
for any one or more of the persons named may be zero if you find that such person
was not negligent or that any negligence on the part of such person was not a proximate
cause of damage. The total of the percentages must equal 100% for the persons whose
negligence did proximately cause the damage.
Third: Multiply the percentage of each defendant times the plaintiff's total damages.
This gives you the amount of damages to be awarded to plaintiff against each defendant
on the line provided in the appropriate verdict form. If the percentage found for lany
one] defendant is zero, then the verdict as to Ithat] defendant will be for Ithat] defendant
and against the plaintiff(s).
N.M. UJI Civ. 13-2219.
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
28. Id.
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tribute to the plaintiff's injury, however, is not considered. The statute continues
the requirement, also contained in the UJI,29 that a person's fault first must be
proven to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury before the factfinder may
take such fault into account in assessing liability of other persons. 3" Although
the statute uses ratios to determine liability, the result in all cases will be the
same as currently is reached when applying the "percentages" formula set forth
in the current Uniform Jury Instruction. The statute does resolve one issue not
addressed in Bartlett or decided in subsequent cases: 3 the question of burden of
proof. Under Article 3A, the defendant who asserts that his liability should be
reduced because of the fault of others bears the burden of proof "that the fault
of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury." 32 The statute delineates
the several liability principle as a substantive affirmative defense available to
defendants, and does not run afoul of the principle that bars the legislature from
writing procedural statutes. 33
The statute contains the phrase "fault of another," in preference to comparative
"negligence". This phrasing reflects the fact that the negligence of plaintiffs and
co-defendants may be compared to the non-negligent conduct of persons liable
on a theory of strict liability in tort.'
Finally, the statute authorizes the factfinder to consider the fault of "persons
not party to the action '3 5 when determining the liability of the defendant. This
provision reflects the current practice under Bartlett,36 and provides statutory
authority for continuation
of the practice unless the courts consider it inappro3
priate to do S0. 1
IV. TO WHAT DOES SEVERAL LIABILITY APPLY?
A. The GeneralRule
In Bartlett, Judge Wood confined the application of several liability to cases
involving "concurrent tortfeasor[s]." 31 Unfortunately, the opinion did not define
29. N.M. UJI Civ. 13-2219.
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
31. In Bowman v. County of Los Alamos, 102 N.M. 660, 662, 699 P.2d 133, 135 n. I(Ct. App. 1985),
the court of appeals noted that "Itihe issue of burden of proof of comparative fault in co-tortfeasor cases
was not addressed in Bartlett." The court declined to consider the issue in Bowman because it was not
necessary to the disposition of the appeal. Id. In Lamkin v. Garcia, 106 N.M. 60, 738 P.2d 932 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 106 N.M. 7,738 P.2d 125 (1987), the court of appeals affirmed a judgment based on a verdict
"laying off" fault on an absent tortfeasor and the court did not state which party had the burden of proof
at trial.
32. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
33. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976). It is within
the purview of the legislature to create substantive affirmative defenses to which the normal rules of pleading,
see N.M.R. Civ. P. 1-008(C), and proof, see, e.g., Wendell v. Foley, 92 N.M. 702, 705, 594 P.2d 750,
753 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979), apply.
34. See Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985); Marchese
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 100 N.M. 259,
669 P.2d 735 (1983).
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
36. In Bartlett,
the jury assessed fault against an unknown person who had fled the scene of the accident
and had not been joined as a defendant. 98 N.M. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580. See also N.M. UJI Civ. 132219.
37. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
38. 98 N.M. at 159. 646 P.2d at 586.
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that term. Many attorneys, seeking to avoid several liability, sought to distinguish
"successive tortfeasors" from "concurrent tortfeasors" and to insist that joint
liability continued to apply to the former.39
Article 3A rejects this attempt to limit several liability to "concurrent tortfeasors." ' Instead, the statute provides that, subject to certain exceptions, joint
liability is abolished and several liability shall apply "[in any cause of action
to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies." 4 "Comparative fault" is
the partial defense which, in Scott v. Rizzo, 42 the supreme court substituted for
the former defense of contributory negligence.4 3 Thus, if the party seeking recovery relies upon a cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault
or comparative negligence is a defense,' the doctrine of several liability applies
unless Article 3A provides an exception.
This link between the defense of comparative negligence and the doctrine of
several liability is a natural one. As Judge Wood noted in Bartlett, the conceptual
underpinning of several liability is consistent with the principle embodied in
comparative negligence that liability should be apportioned solely in accordance
with fault. 5 Where the plaintiff's fault can reduce his recovery from a defendant,
the fault of other tortfeasors likewise normally should reduce the liability of a
defendant to the plaintiff.
The statute applies to causes of action; 46 not to cases. It is possible, therefore,
that in a single case involving multiple claims for relief, a defendant will be
severally liable as to some causes of action and jointly liable as to others. This
calls for care in preparation of the verdict form. In multiple claim cases, a special
verdict form 47 will be necessary to determine whether the jury predicated liability
on the basis of a cause of action to which Article 3A applies or on a cause of
action to which joint and several liability continues to apply.48
B. The Exceptions
Article 3A lists three situations where joint and several liability continues to
apply despite the general rule providing for several liability.49 An additional
39. See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS section 46, n.2 (4th ed. 1971 ); Seattle First Nat'l Bank
v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
40. The distinction between "concurrent" and "successive" tortfeasors is not clear, nor is there a
principled reason for using this distinction alone to demarcate the line between several liability and joint
liability.
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1987).
42. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
43. The court equated "comparative negligence" with "comparative fault principles." Id. at 689, 634
P.2d at 1241.
44. Comparative negligence is not now a defense to actions premised on the theory of negligent misrepresentation. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M.
321, 551 P.2d 1368 (1976). It is a defense to an action asserting that adjoining land owners improperly
collected waters on their land and then discharged the waters into the land of the plaintiff. Gutierrez v. Rio
Rancho Estates, Inc., 93 N.M. 755, 605 P.2d 1154 (1980). Comparative negligence almost certainly is
not a defense to a claim for intentional fraudulent misrepresentation. Ledbetter v. Webb, 103 N.M. 597,
711 P.2d 874 (1985).
45. 98 N.M. at 158-59, 646 P.2d at 585-86.
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1987).
47. SCRA 1986, 1-049(A).
48. For an example of such a situation, see infra text accompanying note 69.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-1(C)(l) through §41-3A-i(C)(3) (Supp. 1987).
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provision, most likely reflecting both deadlock among the drafters about the
existence of additional exceptions and respect for the common law process of
case-by-case development, states that joint and several liability shall continue
to apply "to situations not covered" in the statute, but "having a sound basis
in public policy."'
C. Intentional Wrongdoers
The first exception created by Article 3A provides that joint and several liability
5
applies to persons "who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage." 1
This provision reflects two principles: (1) The moral culpability of an intentional
wrongdoer's conduct is significantly greater than that of a negligent actor; and
(2) The difference justifies the conclusion that the intentional wrongdoer forfeits
52
his right to the equitable principle of apportionment of liability based upon fault.
This exception does not list the specific causes of action which fall within its
ambit. Certainly, torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment and intentional
infliction of mental distress are included.5 3The tort of fraud or deceit also requires
that the defendant intend to do harm' and probably also falls within the provision's scope.
An early draft of the statute provided that joint and several liability also would
apply if the tortfeasor did not intend to do harm, but nonetheless acted in a
wanton, willful or malicious manner. 55The proponents of this exception asserted
that such conduct is sufficiently similar to intentional wrongdoing to justify
equivalent treatment. Opposition to this proposal focused on the ambiguous
50. Id. §41-3A-1(C)(4).
51. Id. §41-3A-I(C)(I). It is not necessary that the defendant subjectively desire to cause harm or injury
for this section to apply. The intent requirement is met if "the actor desires to cause consequences of his
act, or . . . he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965).
52. This "exception" may be redundant. Because the plaintiff's comparative fault is not a defense to
intentional torts, see, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, at 462 (5th ed. 1984), intentional torts
are not "cause[s] of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies," N.M. STAT. ANN. §413A-I(A) (Supp. 1987), and thus do not fall within the scope of Article 3A in any event.
53. Because battery actions, but not negligence cases, are outside the scope of Article 3A, the line
between these two causes of action in medical malpractice claims takes on additional significance. See
Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 406-11, 589 P.2d 180, 190-95 (1978).
54. "Actionable fraud consists of misrepresentation of a fact, known to be untrue by the maker, and
made with an intent to deceive and to induce the other party to act in reliance thereon to his detriment."
Cargill v. Sherrod, 96 N.M. 431, 432-33,631 P.2d 726, 727-28 (1981). In Wirth v. Commercial Resources,
Inc., 96 N.M. 340, 345, 630 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct. App. 1981), the court declared that it was sufficient to
establish fraud "that a false representation was made, either knowingly or recklessly, with the intent to
deceive . . ." (emphasis added).
New Mexico also recognizes a doctrine of "constructive fraud" when a special confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties, Baum v. Great Western Cities, Inc. of New Mexico, 703 F.2d 1197
(10th Cir. 1983) (applying New Mexico law), or when the defendant "acts contrary to public policy, to
sound morals, to the provisions of a statute, etc., however honest the intention ..
" Leitensdorfer v.
Webb, I N.M. 34, 53-54, aff'd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1857) (cited with approval in Wolf and Klar
Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984)); see Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &
Robb, P.A., 27 N.M. State Bar Bull. 153, 156 (Mar. 10, 1988). Because this form of fraud does not
require moral guilt or an actual intent to deceive, Snell v. Comehl, 81 N.M. 248, 466 P.2d 94 (1970), the
section continuing joint liability for those acting with intent to injure may not apply to constructive fraud
claims.
55. See infra Appendix E.
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nature of these terms, and the possibility that litigants seeking to avoid several
liability, as a matter of course, would clutter up negligence actions with gratuitous
charges that the defendant's conduct also had been wanton, willful or malicious.
The drafters avoided a stalemate by agreeing to omit these phrases from the
provision exempting intentional harm from several liability. This omission does
not reflect a determination that, under Article 3A, tortfeasors who are wanton,
willful or malicious necessarily can reduce their liability when negligent wrongdoers also contributed to the plaintiff's harm. Instead, it signals a lack of consensus and a decision to leave to the courts, in construing the "public policy"
exception,56 the resolution of the issue whether conduct, more than negligent
but less than intentionally harmful, should result in joint and several liability for
the tortfeasor.
The earlier drafts did not contain a provision that would have imposed joint
and several liability on a tortfeasor guilty of "gross negligence." The drafters
57
may have excluded gross negligence at the early stages because in Scott v. Rizzo,
the supreme court held that a "distinction between ordinary and gross negligence"
no longer existed in New Mexico, with any such distinction being subsumed in
the factfinder's assessment of percentages of fault. 58 For this reason, it is unlikely
that the supreme court will use the "public policy" exception to impose full
liability upon a grossly negligent defendant in multiple tortfeasor cases, whatever
it decides regarding a defendant whose conduct is wanton, willful or malicious.
The reinstatement of joint and several liability for intentional wrongdoers
applies only to those tortfeasors who act with the intent to do harm.59 The statute
does not provide that all tortfeasors will be jointly and severally liable whenever
any one of them is an intentional wrongdoer. Thus, if one tortfeasor acts with
the intent to do harm and the other merely is negligent, this provision does not
make the negligent wrongdoer jointly and severally liable with the intentional
wrongdoer for the full amount of the judgment. The intentional wrongdoer is
liable for the full damages, but the liability of the negligent wrongdoer normally
is reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the intentional tortfeasor. Only
if another exception to the general rule of several liability applies will the negligent tortfeasor be held jointly liable with the intentional wrongdoer. 60
The form of the verdict must reflect this substantive rule. The factfinder should
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-1(C)(4) (Supp. 1987).

57. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
58. "Under comparative negligence ... [ailso abolished is the distinction between ordinary and gross
negligence." Id. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
Although the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence is abolished when comparing the negligence of a plaintiff and a defendant, gross negligence continues to provide a basis for the award of punitive
damages against a defendant. Ruiz v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (Ct. App.),
cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981); Gonzales v. Sansoy, 103 N.M. 127, 703 P.2d 904
(Ct. App. 1984).
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(C)(1) (Supp. 1987); see supra note 51.
60. Article 3A does not preclude the courts from concluding that policy considerations might compel
joint and several liability where the fault of the negligent tortfeasor contributed to the creation of circumstances under which an intentional tortfeasor foreseeably may do harm. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3Al(C)(4) (Supp. 1987); cf. Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333 (Ct. App.),
cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984) (employer's negligence in hiring and retention permitted
employee to commit intentional tort); Appendix B, Section 2(C)(4) and (5).
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apportion fault between the intentional tortfeasor and the negligent tortfeasor,
but the judgment should reflect the full liability of the intentional wrongdoer and
the partial liability of the negligent defendant. For example, if the jury finds that
the damages are $1000, the negligent tortfeasor is 20% at fault and the intentional
tortfeasor is 80% at fault, the court should enter a judgment for $1000 against
the intentional tortfeasor and a judgment for $200 against the negligent tortfeasor.
In effect, such a judgment results in the imposition of joint and several liability
as to the 20% fault attributed to the negligent tortfeasor. The plaintiff may collect
only $1000, no more than $200 of which may come from the negligent wrongdoer.6 ' Where the plaintiff is found to have been comparatively negligent, the
verdict form is more complicated but the principle is the same. In the above
example, the factfinder should apportion fault among all three parties, but the
judgment should reflect no reduction in the intentional tortfeasor's liability for
either the negligence of the co-defendant or that of the plaintiff.62
D. Vicarious Liability
When a person is liable only because the law imposes vicarious liability upon
that person for the torts of another, there is no basis to compare the fault of each
because one actor's fault, in the eyes of the law, is the fault of the other. The
drafters concluded, therefore, that it makes no sense to apply the doctrine of
several liability to persons who are in a vicarious liability relationship.
Article 3A recognizes this conclusion by providing that joint and several
liability applies "to any persons whose relationship to each other would make
one person vicariously liable for the acts of the other." 63 This provision applies
to master-servant relationships controlled by the doctrine of respondeat superior,'
to liability imposed on members of a joint enterprise for conduct done by one
61. The indemnity and contribution rights of the tortfeasors in such cases are not clear. The negligent
tortfeasor who pays $200 has no claim for contribution against the intentional tortfeasor because he has
not paid more than his fair share of thejudgment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3-2(D) (Supp. 1987). Whether
the intentional tortfeasor who pays the full $1000 to the plaintiff can seek $200 in contribution from the
negligent tortfeasor is less clear. The majority view is that intentional wrongdoers cannot recover on a
contribution theory against co-tortfeasors. Bedard v. Greene, 409 A.2d 676, 679 (Me. 1979); Restatement
(Second) of Torts §886A(3) (1979) ("There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused the harm.").
There is no New Mexico case directly on point. In one case not involving intentional tortfeasors, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that "ltlhe right to contribution exists among joint tortfeasors regardless
of the fact that they have been found liable under different tort theories, such as negligence and strict
products liability." Sanchez v. City of Espanola, 94 N.M. 676, 678, 615 P.2d 993, 995 (Ct. App. 1980).
It is not clear whether the court would rule the same way when the different theories included one or more
intentional torts. See generally, Prosser & Keeton, supra note 52, at 339 ("Some statutes and some decisions
continue the original rule that there is no contribution in favor of those who commit intentional torts, but
some statutes and decisions allow contribution in such cases. ").
62. The intentional tortfeasor does not get the benefit of plaintiff's comparative negligence because
comparative negligence is not a defense to intentional torts. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 52, at 462.
An example may clarify the correct approach. If the damages are $1000 and plaintiff is 10% at fault,
negligent tortfeasor B is 20% at fault and intentional tortfeasor C is 70% at fault, a judgment against C
for $1000 is proper (no reduction because of B's negligence or plaintiff's comparative negligence). A
judgment against B, who gets the benefit of the comparative negligence defense, should be entered for
$200 (20% of the verdict amount of $1000).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(C)(2) (Supp. 1987).
64. E.g., Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 91 N.M. 599. 602-03, 577 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1978).
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member in furtherance of the enterprise,65 and to one who hires an independent
contractor under circumstances where the law imposes vicarious liability on the
person who engages the independent contractor.'
Under this exception, joint liability does not extend to persons outside of the
vicarious liability relationship. Thus, if a plaintiff sues a tortfeasor A, a servant
B and a vicariously liable master C, B and C will be jointly and severally liable
for whatever percentage of fault the factfinder attributes to the servant's conduct.
Tortfeasor A is not jointly and severally liable for any amount merely because
Article 3A imposes joint and several liability on the master and servant for the
servant's tort. Instead, tortfeasor A's liability is limited to the percentage of fault
attributed to him in comparison to the fault of the servant. The master and servant
are treated as a single unit for fault allocation purposes. Their unitary fault is
compared to the fault of the other tortfeasor, and the master and servant are
jointly and severally liable for the fault attributed to the servant.
As in other cases where joint and several liability survives, the doctrines of
indemnity or contribution apply to adjust the ultimate rights between the actual
tortfeasor and the vicariously liable defendant.67 The vicariously liable master
normally will have a right to indemnification from the servant for the full amount
6
that the master paid the plaintiff because of the servant's negligence.
is
vicarious.
party
of
one
liability
the
Section 41-3A-1 (C)(2) applies only when
Thus, if a plaintiff sues an employer both for his own tort (for example, negligent
hiring or retention of the servant)6' and also vicariously for the tort of his servant,
liability based on respondeat superior is joint and several between master and
servant, but liability for negligent hiring is a separate and several liability of the
master. In such cases, the verdict form should have one line on which the master
and servant are treated as a single unit for determining the fault attributed to
their vicarious liability, and a separate line upon which the factfinder may assess
an additional percentage of fault for the master's own tortious conduct. The
master is liable severally for his own tortious conduct and also is liable jointly
and severally with the servant for the percentage of fault assigned to the master
and servant, as a unit, for the servant's tortious conduct.
E. Product Liability Cases
Strict liability in tort cases posed special problems for the drafters of Chapter
141. Strict liability is a "no fault" theory of recovery; defendants are liable for
marketing defective products even if they were not negligent. ° Several liability,
65. See, e.g., Walton v. Fujita Tourist Enter. Co., 380 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Pritchett
v. Kinberling Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Dando Enters., Ltd. v.
Pritchett, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
66. E.g., Budager v. Amrep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 119, 637 P.2d 547, 550 (1981); Srader v. Pecos
Constr. Co., 71 N.M. 320, 327, 378 P.2d 364, 368-69 (1963); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§40929 (1965).
67. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-(I)F (Supp. 1987).
68. E.g., Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494, 433 P.2d 79 (1967); Hancock v. Berger,
77 N.M. 321, 422 P.2d 359 (1967).
69. See, e.g., F&T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 594 P.2d 745 (1979).
70. "The purpose behind strict products liability ... is to allow an injured consumer to recover against
a seller or manufacturer without the requirement of proving ordinary negligence." Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City
of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 67, 618 P.2d 1230, 1231 (1980).
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however, is premised upon the capacity of the factfinder to apportion fault among
tortfeasors. 7" Because negligence cannot be apportioned among persons who are
not at fault, it would seem proper that strictly liable defendants should not benefit
from the doctrine of several liability. Nonetheless, strict liability cases fit within
the general provision of Article 3A affirming several liability as the norm. Section
41-3A-I(A) imposes several liability in causes of action "to which the doctrine
of comparative fault applies," 72 and New Mexico courts have held that the
plaintiff's comparative fault is a partial defense in strict product liability cases.73
The drafters concluded that there is no principled way to compare the fault
of tortfeasors, each of whose liability is premised solely upon a "no fault" theory
of strict product liability. 4 To effectuate this decision, Section 41-3A-1(C)(3)
exempts persons strictly liable for defective products from application of the
doctrine of several liability.75 Instead, all members of the chain of distribution
who are liable only under the theory of strict product liability are treated as a
single unit for purposes of fault allocation; if they are the only tortfeasors, they
are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.
If, in addition to the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer, there are other
tortfeasors liable on a negligence theory, the principle remains the same but its
application is different. The premise that there can be no comparison of fault
among those liable only for strict product liability remains, and requires those
in the chain of distribution to be liable jointly and severally for their collective
share of the harm done to the plaintiff.76 Just as the courts declare that the
culpability of the strictly liable manufacturer can be compared to the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff in a product liability case,77 however, so too, the
unitary culpability of the strictly liable marketers may be compared to that of
the negligent co-tortfeasor who is not strictly liable. The strictly liable marketers
are treated as a single unit whose collective culpability is compared to that of
the negligent co-tortfeasor. Each strictly liable marketer is jointly and severally
liable for the percentage of culpability attributed to the marketing unit, but is
not liable for the percentage of fault attributed to the negligent co-tortfeasor.
The negligent tortfeasor is severally liable only for the percentage of fault attributed to him.
Treatment of the strictly liable marketers as a single unit is premised on the
inability of a factfinder to compare fault where all the tortfeasors are sued on a
"no fault" theory of liability. If the plaintiff pursues both a negligence and
a
strict tort theory against one or more of the marketers, the issue becomes more
complex. A marketer is severally liable for the percentage of the harm attributed
71. Bartlett abolished joint and several liability in cases in which "two persons whose concurrent
negligence contributed to cause plaintiff's injury" formerly had been held jointly and severally liable.
Bartlett,
98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581 (emphasis added).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1987).
73. See cases cited supra note 34.
74. See generally W. Westerbeke and H. Metzler, Comparative Fault and Strict Products Liability in
Kansas: Reflections on the Distinction Between InitialLiability and Ultimate Loss Allocation, 28 U. Kan.
L. Rev. 25, 91-98 (1979).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(C)(3) (Supp. 1987).
76. Id.
77. See cases cited supra note 34.
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to his negligence and also is jointly liable with other marketers for the percentage
of culpability attributed to the strict product liability of the marketers as a unit.7"
Separate lines on the jury verdict form will be required to assure that the jury's
findings distinguish between the fault and no-fault bases of liability in such cases.
As to marketers who are jointly and severally liable for the percentage of total
damage attributed to their tortious collective conduct, the doctrines of contribution79
and indemnity ° apply to determine the ultimate division of liability among them.
Normally, marketers lower on the distribution chain (e.g., the retailer) will have
indemnity rights against those who are above them. 8' This arrangement usually
will result in the manufacturer ultimately absorbing the full amount of the joint
and several liability to the plaintiff.82
F. The Public Policy Exception
The drafters of Article 3A agreed to the three exceptions to several liability
contained in Section 41-3A-1 (C). Beyond that, however, they only could agree
to disagree, and to leave the courts free to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether additional pockets of joint and several liability should survive the general
adoption of several liability in New Mexico. Section 41-3A-1(C)(4) provides,
therefore, that in addition to the three exceptions specifically listed, joint and
several liability also applies "to situations not covered by any of the foregoing
and having a sound basis in public policy. ' '8 3 The drafters chose this language
in order to assure that the courts will have the same flexibility to determine
exceptions to several liability that they would possess if they were applying
Bartlett rather than construing the language of Article 3A. The issues expressly
left undecided in Bartlett,' and those proposed for resolution in earlier draft
proposals of Senate Bill 164,5 are illustrative of the types of questions which
78. If the factfinder assigns 60% of the fault to the negligent act of a manufacturer, and the manufacturer,
wholesaler and distributor are held liable in strict product liability for 40% of the fault, the manufacturer
is severally liable for 60% of the damages and the three marketers are jointly and severally liable for the
remaining 40%.
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-3-1 to 41-3-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1986), as modified by N.M. STAT. ANN. §413-2(D) (Supp. 1987).
80. N.M. Stat Ann. §41-3A-I(F) (Supp. 1987); see Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66,
67, 618 P.2d 1230, 1231 (1980); cf. Jeske v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 89 N.M. 786, 558 P.2d 55 (Ct. App.
1976).
81. Aalco, 95 N.M. at 67, 618 P.2d at 1231; see Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 738 P.2d 1331 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 24,738 P.2d 518 (1987) (purchaser liable to third party may obtain indemnity
from manufacturer).
82. Occasionally, the manufacturer of the product may have a claim for indemnity against the supplier
of a defect component incorporated into the final product by the manufacturer. Cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). In addition, the parties in
the distribution chain might vary the results of the common law indemnity doctrine through contractual
provisions between them. See generally, Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689. 712 P.2d 1351 (1985). If
the manufacturer is bankrupt or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, marketers below the manufacturer on
the distribution chain may be unable to pass the ultimate responsibility to the manufacturer.
83. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(C)(4) (Supp. 1987).
84. Bartlett
left for later resolution the issue of whether several liability would apply "where one of the
tortfeasors would not be subject to any liability." 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581; but see Taylor v.
Delgamo Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983); St. Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt, Inc.,
101N.M. 84, 678 P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1984).
85. See infra Appendix B & E.
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the drafters intended the courts to resolve free of any constraints flowing from
the passage of Article 3A.
G. The Separate Injury Problem
The doctrine of joint and several liability is designed in part to solve a problem
which arises when multiple tortfeasors cause a single, indivisible injury.86 For
example, if two negligent drivers, acting separately, both strike a pedestrian who
thereby suffers a single broken leg, the pedestrian may be unable to prove which
tortfeasor caused what portion of his single harm. Rather than rule against the
plaintiff for failure to establish causation, the law instead chose to impose joint
and several liability on the tortfeasors who caused the indivisible injury. This
solution assures recovery for the pedestrian even in the absence of proof allocating
the injury between its two negligent causes.8 7
Bartlett and Article 3A generally abolish this form of joint and several liability.
Where an injury cannot be allocated among tortfeasors based upon cause, New
Mexico law authorizes an allocation of liability based upon comparative fault.88
Where a plaintiff's harm can be divided into separate injuries and allocated on
the basis of cause to different tortfeasors, there is no reason to apply joint and
several liability; each tortfeasor is fully liable for the separate harm that he
caused. 9 Because joint and several liability does not apply where the harm is
causally divisible," the substitution of several liability for joint and several
liability has no effect on the rule that tortfeasors are entirely liable for all the
harm that is proximately caused solely by their own tortious conduct. 9
Section 41-3A-I(D) recognizes that the division of liability based on fault is
not applicable where the tortfeasors cause distinct harms. When causally distinct
harms occur, "the fault of each of the persons proximately causing one harm
shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately causing other distinct
harms. Each person is severally liable only for the distinct harm which that
person proximately caused." 92
Discussion of a hypothetical drawn loosely from one version of the facts
presented in Martinez v. FirstNational Bank of Santa Fe9 3 illustrates the anticipated application of this section. Able suffers a badly bruised arm in an accident
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §879 (1979); 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 10.1,at 27 (2nd ed. 1986).
87. Id.
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1987). But see id. §41-3A-I(C) for exceptions.
89. See sources cited supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. See Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 750, 688 P.2d 779, 787 (Ct. App. 1983), cert.
quashed, 101 N.M. 155, 685 P.2d 963 (1984) (suit only for enhanced or "second collision" injuries caused
by defective design of vehicle: "Because crashworthiness liability is based only on enhanced or additional
injuries, the concurrent tortfeasor concept is not applicable.")
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(D) (Supp. 1987).
93. Professor Occhialino participated in the preparation of a Brief Amicus Curiae submitted by the New
Mexico Trial Lawyers Association in this case. The Court of Appeals decided the case in 1987. The decision
was withdrawn and the supreme court granted certiorari, 26 N.M. State Bar Bull. 905 (November 12,
1987). The supreme court quashed certiorari on May 28, 1988. The opinion of the court of appeals was
then officially reported. Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct.
App. 1987), cert. quashed -N.M. -,
-P.2d
-(1988).
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as the result of the combined negligence of Able and Baker. Able receives medical
treatment from Dr. Charles who treats the injury in a negligent manner. At the
end of the treatment, Able's arm is permanently paralyzed.
If Able sues Dr. Charles for negligence and is unable to demonstrate that he
suffered two distinct injuries-the bruise as a result of the accident, and paralysis
as a result of Dr. Charles' treatment, then the doctrine of several liability will
apply. Dr. Charles, a negligent contributor to Able's indivisible injury, will be
liable for Able's total damages, diminished by the percentage of fault attributed
to Baker and the percentage of fault attributed to the comparative negligence of
Able.
On the other hand, if Able can present evidence sufficient to convince the jury
that he suffered two distinct injuries 94-- the bruise as the result of Able and
Baker's negligence, and a second distinct injury, paralysis, as a result of Dr.
Charles' malpractice-the special rule contained in Section 41 -3A-I(D) comes
into play. Baker will be fully liable for the initial injury (the bruise), less only
whatever percentage of fault the factfinder attributes to the negligence of Able.
Dr. Charles will be fully liable for the separate enhanced injury (the paralysis).
The drafters agreed that, in this hypothetical situation, Dr. Charles should not
be able to diminish his responsibility for the enhanced injury by pointing either
to the fault of Baker in causing the original accident, or the negligence of Able
95
which contributed to the bruise he initially suffered.
The drafters could not agree, however, whether Baker should be liable for
Able's paralysis as well as for the initial bruise. The argument for Baker's liability
is that, traditionally, the original tortfeasor is liable not only for the initial harm
he causes, but also for subsequent harm caused by other wrongdoers which
9
reasonably is foreseeable to the original tortfeasor. Because Section 41-3A-9 7
of proximate cause,
doctrine
the
alter
not
does
I(G) provides that Article 3A
that the original
argued
paralysis
for
Able's
proponents of Baker's liability
tortfeasor should continue to be liable not only for Able's initial injury, but also
for his subsequent paralysis, a foreseeable consequence of the initial harm.
The argument against the continued liability of the original tortfeasor for Able's
paralysis is that Section 41-3A-1 (D) seeks to make a clean break between distinct
harms. The section provides that "the fault of each of the persons proximately
causing one harm shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately
causing other distinct harms." 98 To impose liability for two distinct harms upon
the initial tortfeasor, therefore, would seem to be contrary to the language and
spirit of this section. The drafters concluded that, even if they could not agree
on this specific issue, Article 3A should provide some guidance in cases involving
distinct harms. By choosing to forego resolution of this dispute, therefore, the
drafters delegated to the courts the burden of deciding whether Article 3A and
94. Cf. Duran, 101 N.M. at 750-53, 688 P.2d at 787-90. (discussion of proof required that separate
injuries occurred).
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(D) (Supp. 1987); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §879
comment b (1979).
96. E.g., Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955).
97. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(G). See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
98. N.M. STAT ANN. §41-3A-I(D) (Supp. 1987).
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the logic of Bartlett call for a change in the previous law making initial tortfeasors
liable both for the initial harm they caused and for the distinct harm caused by
subsequent, foreseeable tortfeasors.
V. THE EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT
Section 41-3A-I(E) provides:
No defendant who is severally liable shall be entitled to contribution from
any other person, nor shall such defendant be entitled to reduce the dollar
damages determined by the fact finder to be owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff in accordance with Subsection B of this section by any amount that
the plaintiff has recovered from any other person whose fault may have also
proximately caused injury to the plaintiff."
The drafters designed this provision to codify the ruling of the New Mexico
Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Galt.'" As a result, this section governs only
where a plaintiff seeks to recover from a severally liable, nonsettling tortfeasor
after already having received partial payment through settlement with other
tortfeasors.
In Wilson, the parents and conservator of a brain-damaged infant brought suit
against three doctors and a hospital for the allegedly negligent care and treatment
of the child. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs settled with the hospital and one doctor,
as well as with a lab technician who had not been named as a defendant. The
plaintiffs then proceeded to trial, at which the jury awarded damages and apportioned fault. The amount previously paid by the three settling tortfeasors
exceeded the total amount of damages awarded by the jury.'' The trial court
held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any additional recovery because the
settlement amounts exceeded the amount which the jury found the plaintiffs
should receive as damages.
As a matter of law, the court of appeals disagreed." 2 Relying on the precepts
of comparative fault and several liability laid down in Scott and Bartlett, the
court reasoned:
If the injured person settles and releases one tortfeasor, the consideration
paid would satisfy only that tortfeasor's percentage of fault, even though
no jury determination of the amount of his liability exists at the time of
settlement. If the injured person pursues his claim against the other tortfeasors, recovery will be only against them for their respective shares of fault.
Thus, the injured person, by settling, would not recover more than his total
damages, because each tortfeasor would pay, by settlement or judgment,
only his respective share.'
Where the settling tortfeasor pays less than his apportioned share of fault, the
plaintiff must bear the loss and cannot recover the shortfall from any other
99. Id. §41-3A-l(E).
100. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983).
101. Id. at 230, 668 P.2d at 1107.
102. See infra note 104.
103. Wilson. 100 N.M. at 232, 668 P.2d at 1109.
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tortfeasor. On the other hand, "[i]f the settling tortfeasor paid more in settlement
than his apportioned share of the total damages as determined," as was the case
in Wilson, "the injured person, without reduction, would retain the benefit of
the contractually made bargain."'"
Section I(E) codifies the holding of the court of appeals in Wilson. First, the
section makes clear that, as among tortfeasors who are severally liable, there is
no basis for contribution.' 5 "If each concurrent tortfeasor is liable only for his
respective share of the negligence, no need exists for him [either to] seek contribution from other tortfeasors or protect himself against having to contribute." "
More importantly, Section I(E) enacts the specific ruling laid down in Wilson
by declaring that no tortfeasor found to be both at fault and severally liable can
reduce the amount he owes to the plaintiff by any amount recovered by the
plaintiff from another tortfeasor. Instead, the section "carr[ies] out the principles
laid down in Claymore [Scott] and Bartlett" by providing, as Wilson suggested,
for "[r]eduction of the recovery against nonsettling defendants by the percentage
to the settling defendants, as opposed to a specific
of negligence attributable
07
dollar amount.'
The approach taken by the drafters in Section I(E) "encourages settlements,"
by allowing a tortfeasor to "buy his peace" without fear of either further liability
to the injured person or responsibility for contribution to other tortfeasors.'"8
Moreover, as the court observed in Wilson, "[tihis approach also discourages
other tortfeasors from taking advantage of the good faith efforts of settling
tortfeasors" by ensuring that each person remains fully liable for his respective
share of the damages attributed to his negligence."°
VI. INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
In enacting Chapter 141, the drafters' primary objective was to codify the
adoption of several liability and to provide for instances in which joint and
several liability still may apply. The drafters did not intend to interfere with
existing contract rights providing for indemnification or contribution, or to curtail
rights to indemnity that arise independent of contract. This point is made expressly in Section 41-3A-I(F), which provides that "[niothing in this section
shall be construed to affect or impair any right of indemnity or contribution
arising out of any contract of [sic] agreement or any right of indemnity otherwise
provided by law.""'
104. Id. Although the court articulated these principles in Wilson, it did not apply them to the specific
facts present there. The court noted that, in the written settlement agreements between the plaintiffs and
the settling tortfeasors, the plaintiffs promised to credit the amount of settlement against any recovery from
the nonsettling defendants. Id. at 233, 668 P.2d at 1110. Holding the plaintiffs to be "bound by their
bargain," the court refused to apply its holding to the facts of this case. Id.
105. See infra notes 127-29.
106. Wilson, 100 N.M. at 231, 668 P.2d at 1108.
107. Id. at 232, 668 P.2d at 1109.
108. Id.
109. id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
110. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(F).
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By formulating this provision, the drafters indicated both their awareness and
approval of rights to indemnification and contribution which arise in certain kinds
of contracts' or which are imposed by operation of law." 2 This section specifically leaves such obligations intact, and allows them to be enforced independently of the operation of Article 3A.
VII. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Section 41-3A-1(G) states:
Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or implicitly,
any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law. Nothing
in this section alters the doctrine of proximate cause.
This section is a housekeeping provision. It cleans up several loose ends without
containing much substance of its own.
This section makes clear that Article 3A applies only to causes of action to
which the doctrine of comparative fault applies. The Article itself does not create
a new cause of action for "comparative fault," nor does it fashion new or separate
causes of action not otherwise recognized by law. In other words, defendants
cannot be held liable solely on the basis of Article 3A. Instead, an underlying
cause of action assigning responsibility to a party must exist independently of
Article 3A. The statute then applies to determine the extent of the tortfeasors'
liability and the allocation of each tortfeasor's share of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages.
Similarly, the second sentence of Section 41-3A-I(G) preserves the current
requirement that proximate cause be proven in order to impose liability for
tortious wrongs." 3 As New Mexico courts long have recognized, the mere fact
that a party is negligent is not enough to support the imposition of liability.'
In addition, the alleged wrongful conduct also must be shown to have been a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Nothing in Article 3A alters this concept,"15 and Section 41-3A-I(G) simply makes clear that the provisions establishing several or joint and several liability apply only if the existing requirement
of proximate cause has been satisfied." 6
Ill. The drafters did not intend that this section breathe new life into indemnification agreements which
are void and will not be enforced for reasons of public policy. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-7-1 (Repl.
Pamp. 1986)(indemnity agreement in construction contract); id. §53-8-26 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) (indemnity
for officers and directors of non-profit corporations); id. §56-7-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1986)(oil and gas agreement);
id. §40-3-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (contract by one spouse to indemnify surety with community property).
112. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-11-13(G) (Supp. 1987) (Educational Retirement Act); id. §5311-4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Indemnity for Officers and Directors of Corporations); id. §53-4-9.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1987); id. §62-15-9.2; id. §62-15-3(Q) (indemnity for Trustee of Rural Electric Cooperative).
113. See, e.g., N.M. UJI Civ. 13-305 (Recomp. 1986).
114. See, e.g., MRC Properties, Inc. v. Gies, 98 N.M. 710, 652 P.2d 732 (1982); May v. Baklini, 85
N.M. 150, 509 P.2d 1345 (Ct. App.), ceri. denied, 85 N.M. 144, 509 P.2d 1339 (1973); Lopez v. Maes,
81 N.M. 693, 472 P.2d 658 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 721, 472 P.2d 984 (1970).
115. But see supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
116. That liability, in whatever form, only can be imposed upon a finding that the conduct of the
defendant proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries is stated in less explicit terms throughout Article 3A.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-3A-I(A), -1(B), -I(D), -I(E). See also id. §52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
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VIII. APPLICABILITY
There are two important points in determining whether Chapter 141 applies
to a particular civil action. First, the statute governs only those civil actions
initially filed on or after July 1, 1987. "7 The crucial date for establishing the
applicability of this statute to a specific lawsuit, therefore, is the date on which
the action was filed, not the date on which the cause of action arose. Second,
Chapter 141 controls only those actions initially filed on or after July 1, 1987.,"
The rationale behind this limitation is to prevent a plaintiff in a lawsuit commenced before this date from seeking to have that action dismissed without
prejudice," 9 and then refiling the complaint after the effective date of the statute
in order to take advantage of its provisions.
IX. DEFINITIONS
Section 41-3A-2 provides that, "[a]s used in this act, 'person' means any
2
individual or entity of any kind whatsoever.""' This provision makes clear that
Chapter 141 applies without distinction both to people and to any form of
corporation or association which may be liable for tortious conduct. This result
is in keeping with the unspoken holdings found in earlier cases in which the
New Mexico appellate courts applied Bartlett and Scott without regard to whether
2
the parties were individuals or business entities. ' Moreover, this section precludes future litigants from successfully asserting that the use of the word "person" in Chapter 141 somehow indicates that enterprises are not subject to its
provisions.
X. AMENDING THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT
In recognizing the continuing, if limited, vitality of joint and several liability,
the drafters found it necessary to amend the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 122 The purpose of this amendment is to define the relative burden
of each jointly liable tortfeasor for contribution in a manner consistent with the
allocation of damages established in Bartlett and Article 3A. Unfortunately, the
language chosen by the drafters does not unequivocally accomplish this end, but
a properly broad judicial interpretation of the enactment easily cures this deficiency.
Before the adoption of several liability in Bartlett, multiple tortfeasors were
jointly and severally liable for indivisible damages proximately caused by their
117. 1987 N.M. Laws ch. 141, sec. 5.
118. Id.
119. See N.M.R. Civ. P. 1-041.
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-2 (Supp. 1987).
121. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Duran v. General Motors
Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 155, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Guitard v. Gulf
Oil Co., 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670 P.2d 581 (1983).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-3-1 to 41-3-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
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wrongful conduct.'23 If a joint tortfeasor paid the plaintiff the total dollar amount
awarded as damages, or more than his "pro rata share thereof," the Uniform
Act allowed him to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. 24 As
construed by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Commercial Union Assurance
Co. v. Western Farm
Bureau Insurance Co., 2 the term "pro rata share" meant
"equal share."' 26 Under the Uniform Act as interpreted by the courts, a joint
tortfeasor ultimately was to be responsible for no more than his "equal share"
of the common liability. Thus, if there were three joint tortfeasors whose conduct
proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, any one of the jointly liable tortfeasors
might have to pay the full amount of the judgment to the plaintiff. The other
two joint tortfeasors then would be obligated to contribute one-third of the
plaintiff's damages to the tortfeasor making full payment regardless of the relative
fault of the tortfeasors.
After the decision in Bartlett, the courts found no use for the Uniform Act.
In Wilson v. Galt," the court of appeals all but rendered the Uniform Act a
nullity by declaring that "the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act no
longer has force in this State with respect to contribution among concurrent
tortfeasors. "128 The court reasoned that, "since joint and several liability provides
the foundation under the Uniform Act for the pro rata allocation of burden among
tortfeasors, Bartlett 1effectively
eliminates any basis for contribution among con29
current tortfeasors."

Chapter 141 gives new life to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act. First, by preserving the doctrine of joint and several liability in some
situations to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, 30 the statute reestablishes the need for a mechanism to allocate the total dollar amount awarded
as damages among the joint tortfeasors. Second, Chapter 141 modifies the prior
formula for allocating contribution shares by adding a new paragraph to Section
41-3-2 which provides:
D. A pro rata share shall be the portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's
percentage of fault to the total percentage of fault attributed to all joint
tortfeasors.' 3
The remainder of this section is unchanged.
Section D defines a joint tortfeasor's liability for contribution in a manner
intended to be identical with the description of several liability found in Section
123. See generally, PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 52, §§48-52.
124. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
125. 93 N.M. 507, 601 P.2d 1203 (1979).
126. Id. at508, 601 P.2d at 1204. The court thus defined "pro rata"to be synonymous with "per
capita."
127. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983).
128. td. at231, 668 P.2d at 1108.
129. Id. See also Novacek v. Grant Oil Tool Co., No. CIV 85-1579 HB, slip op. at 2 (D.N.M. July
16, 1986); Howard v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Products Division, No. CIV 81-368 BB, slip
op. at 5-7 (D.N.M. May 25, 1984).
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-l(C) (Supp. 1987).
131. Id. §41-3-2(D).
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41-3A-1 (B). As actually drafted, however, section D does not clearly accomplish
this result, and to achieve this end will require careful judicial interpretation of
the provision.
Assume that a jury finds damages of $10,000 and apportions negligence as
follows: plaintiff 10%, defendant I 40%, defendant II 30% and defendant III
20%, with all three defendants held to be jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff. If defendant I discharges the entire liability owed to the plaintiff by all
three defendants ($9,000), 13 2 he then is entitled to seek contribution from the
other two joint tortfeasors in amounts that do not exceed the "pro rata share"
of each.
As drafted, Section D appears to compel the following approach. First, calculate "the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's percentage of fault to the total fault
attributed to all joint tortfeasors." In this example, the ratio for defendant I is
40% over 90% (the fault attributed to all joint tortfeasors), or 44.4%. For defendant II, that figure is 33.3% (30% over 90%), and for defendant I11,
the figure
is 22.2% (20% over 90%). These figures then are multiplied by the "total dollar
amount awarded as damages to the plaintiff" ($10,000),
and the resulting amount
33
is the pro rata share for each joint tortfeasor. 1
As is evident by this example, this construction of the formula contained in
Section D produces incorrect results because it requires each joint tortfeasor to
be responsible for an amount greater than his proportionate share of fault. Here,
defendant I will be required to bear $4,444.44 of the $10,000 amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff: a figure in excess of the degree of fault that the jury
attributed to his conduct. Under a proper formulation, defendant I should be
responsible for no more than 40% of the total dollar amount awarded by the
factfinder as damages to the plaintiff, or $4,000.
In order to avoid this construction of Section D, it is important to understand
the purpose underlying the amendment to the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act. As shown above, under the Uniform Act, once a joint tortfeasor
satisfies more than his "pro rata share" of the common liability owed to the
plaintiff, he is entitled to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. "
Given that the doctrine of comparative fault continues to govern actions in which
the imposition of joint and several liability continues to apply, such contributions
should result in each joint tortfeasor's share of the total judgment amount awarded
to the plaintiff being proportionate to his degree of fault. 35
' This result is essential
if the two goals of comparative fault identified by the court in Scott are to be
achieved: "(1) apportionment of fault between or among negligent parties whose
negligence proximately causes any part of a loss or injury, and (2) apportionment
132. Because the jury found the plaintiff to be 10% at fault, the total amount of damages awarded by
the jury is reduced by a proportionate amount.
133. The pro rata share for defendant I is $4,444.44 (44.4% x $10,000); $3,333.33 for defendant I
(33.3% x $10,000) and $2,222.22 for defendant ill(22.2% x $10,000). Note that this total of each joint
tortfeasor's pro rata share equals $10,000, "the total dollar amount of damages awarded by the jury," not
the $9,000 for which these three defendants are liable after the verdict is reduced by 10% and a judgment
entered for only $9,000 to reflect the comparative negligence of the plaintiff. See supra note 132.
134. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
135. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
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of the total damages resulting from such loss or injury in proportion to the fault
of each party." 136
These goals easily can be achieved by construing a joint tortfeasor's "pro rata
share" in a manner identical to the method articulated in Section 42-3A-I(B)
for determining several liability. Under this formulation, each joint tortfeasor is
liable only for that "portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to
the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such [joint tortfeasor's] fault to the total
fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants and persons not
party to the action."' 37 Applying this standard to the above example, the ratio
for defendant I would be 40% over 100% (40%), the total fault attributed to all
persons, rather than 40% over 90%, (44.4%) the total percentage of fault attributed to all joint tortfeasors. Multiplying that percentage figure by the total
dollar amount awarded as damages to the plaintiff results in a pro rata share for
defendant I of $4,000 (40% over 100% x $10,000); the amount precisely in
proportion to defendant I's fault. Similar correct results will result for defendants
1I and 111.138
This proposal has the advantage of reading Section D in a manner identical
to Section 1(B) of Article 3A in order to reach a similar result. Moreover, this
construction takes cognizance of the relationship between joint and several liability and comparative fault, and insures that each tortfeasor ultimately will be
liable only for the degree of harm proximately caused by his conduct regardless
of the method of recovery available to the plaintiff.
The problem with this construction is that it reads into Section D language
which the drafters omitted from this provision, but which they inserted into
Section 1(B). Courts properly are reluctant to engage in such legislative redrafting
purely on judicial whim. Because it is necessary to achieve the explicit purpose
of the provision, however, the suggested construction is consistent with the
supreme court's approach to legislative interpretation:
A fundamental rule in statutory construction is that we must ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the Legislature ....
We must also consider
the language of the Act as a whole ... and we must also give a statute its
literal reading if the words used are plain and unambiguous, provided such
a construction would not lead to an injustice, absurdity or contradiction."9
Given that an overly literal construction of Section D might lead to results
contrary to the purposes of Article 3A, the courts can and should construe the
language of this section in a manner consistent with that of Section 41-3A- I(B).
XI. AMENDING THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
The drafters amended the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act provision
governing an employer's right of reimbursement for compensation benefits paid
136. Id. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I(B) (Supp. 1987).
138. For defendant I1, the pro rata share would be $3,000 (30% over 100% x $10,000), and the pro
rata share for defendant II equals $2,000 (20% over 100% x $10,000).
139. Atencio v. Bd. of Educ. of Penasco Indep. School Dist., 99 N.M. 168, 171, 655 P.2d 1012, 1015

(1982).
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to an injured worker from the worker's judgment against a third-party tortfeasor.
The amendment, §52-1-10.1, states:
Notwithstanding anything in the workers' compensation law to the contrary,
if the fault of the worker's employer or those for whom the employer is
legally responsible, other than the injured worker, is found to have proximately caused the worker's injury, the employer's right to reimbursement
from the proceeds of the worker's recovery in any action against any wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of fault, if any, attributed to the
employer or those for whom the employer is responsible, other than the
injured worker.'"
The drafters included this section to reverse the decision of the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation,Inc.,"' and the amendment
resolves the substantive issues this case presented. At the same time, however,
the amendment raises several procedural problems which the courts will have
to resolve.
In Taylor, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a negligent employer (or
its insurer) is entitled to full reimbursement of compensation benefits paid to an
injured worker even if the worker recovers only partial damages from a thirdparty tortfeasor because the damages are reduced by the percentage of fault
attributed to the immune employer.' 42 The court ruled that the Workers' Compensation Act is a worker's exclusive remedy against an employer,'43 and as a
result, "'pure' comparative negligence principles do not effect an employer's
insurer's right of reimbursement ... .'"
There are several problems with the result reached in Taylor.'45 First, the
court's holding authorized unfair results. For example, suppose an injured worker
receives $5,000 in compensation benefits. In a subsequent third-party action,
the jury finds damages of $50,000 and apportions negligence as follows: plaintiff
5%; third-party tortfeasor 10%; and employer 85%. In this situation, the injured
worker can recover only $5,000 from the third party (10% of $50,000) and,
under Taylor, must use this entire amount to reimburse the employer or its insurer
for the compensation benefits previously paid. The injured worker, only 5% at
fault, is left with no recovery whatsoever; yet the employer, guilty of 85% of
the fault, recovers 100% reimbursement. "Under such circumstances, the worker's right to be 'made whole' in a third-party action is not merely diminished
but eliminated entirely,"' 4" a result completely at odds with the purposes behind
workers' compensation. ,'
The court's decision to apply the Bartlett several liability doctrine to the
employee's third-party action, and thus to diminish the worker's damages by
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
141. 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
142. Id. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
143. Id. at 139-40, 667 P.2d at 446-47.
144. Id. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
145. See generally, Note, Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right To
Full Reimbursement Of Compensation Benefits Out Of Worker's Partial Third Party Recovery--Taylor v.
Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 14 N.M. L. REv. 437 (1984).
146. Id. at 447. See also Taylor, 100 N.M. at 143, 667 P.2d at 450 (Payne, J., dissenting).
147. See generally, A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1.00-3.40 (1986).
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the percentage of fault attributed to the immune employer, but not to allow such
principles to diminish the employer's right of reimbursement, also is unjust. The
Taylor holding prevents an injured worker from securing full compensation for
his injuries, yet virtually guarantees that a negligent employer or its insurer will
recover all of the payments made to the worker.' 48 This result flies in the face
of the New Mexico Supreme Court's own statement in Brown v. Arapahoe
Drilling Co., 49 made more than twenty years before Taylor: "[Tlhe right to
[reimbursement] is not such a right as should operate to destroy the benefits of
the Workmen's Compensation statute. . . . The purpose of our statute is to protect
the workman. . . . The intent of the [reimbursement provision] is to prevent

double recovery, not to preclude any recovery at all.'
The drafters intended that the amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act
ameliorate the harsh results wrought by the decision in Taylor."' The amendment
explicitly applies the doctrine of comparative fault to an employer's right of
reimbursement for compensation benefits by providing that "the employer's right
to reimbursement from the proceeds of the worker's recovery in any action
against any wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of fault, if any,
attributed to the employer, or those for whom the employer is responsible, other
than the injured worker."' 52
For example, assume that an injured worker receives $20,000 from his employer in compensation benefits and then sues a third-party tortfeasor for damages. If the jury awards damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $100,000, and
finds the third-party tortfeasor to be 60% at fault, the employer 40% at fault,
and the plaintiff 0% at fault, the plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment of
$60,000 against the third-party tortfeasor. Under Section 52- 1-10. 1, the employer
would receive no reimbursement from the worker's judgment against the thirdparty tortfeasor because its percentage of fault reduced the plaintiff's judgment
by $40,000 (40%) and this amount exceeds the amount the employer paid to the
worker in compensation benefits.
Under Section 52-1-10. 1, the employer may obtain reimbursement for compensation benefits paid to an injured worker from the worker's judgment against
a third-party tortfeasor only when the percentage of fault attributable to the
employer reduces the worker's recovery by an amount less than the compensation
benefits paid. In such cases, the employer is entitled to reimbursement for the
amount paid in compensation benefits, less the amount by which the employer's
percentage of fault reduced the verdict for the worker in the third-party action.
By enacting this amendment, the Legislature thus rejected the New Mexico
Supreme Court's holding in Taylor, and codified instead the position that Justices
Payne and Sosa expressed in dissent:
148. Only when the amount recovered from the third-party tortfeasor is less than the amount paid by
the employer in compensation benefits will the employer receive less than total reimbursement from the
proceeds of the action.
149. 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816 (1962).
150. Id. at 103-04, 370 P.2d at 819-20.
151. The court in Taylor acknowledged the harshness of its ruling, but insisted that the Workers'
Compensation statute dictated the result, and that the legislature would have to correct the problem. 100
N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
152. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
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IThe comparative negligence doctrine should be read in conjunction with
the workmen's compensation statutes to require that an employer or its
workmen's compensation carrier should be reimbursed from monies recovered by the injured workman from a third-party tortfeasor only in those
instances where the employer or its insurer has paid more than its proportionate share of the employee's damages."'
Moreover, the amendment restores the employer's right to reimbursement to its
4
original secondary position vis-a-vis the worker's right to recover damagesT
and prevents a negligent employer completely escaping from any consequences
of its negligence.
One significant problem exists with the solution crafted by Section 52-1-10. 1:
The statute purports to bind the employer to a determination of its fault in the
worker's suit against the third-party tortfeasor, whether or not the employer is
a party to that lawsuit. In the above example, the employer provided $20,000
in benefits to the injured worker, and in the worker's subsequent third-party
action, was found to be 40% at fault. This finding affects the employer's right
to reimbursement, even though the employer may not have been a party to that
action, and irrespective of whether the employer participated in the suit or even
had notice of its existence. 55
' The absence of any guarantee that the employer
will have the opportunity to prove that it was not at fault and is entitled to full
reimbursement for benefits paid to the injured worker would be as unfair to the
employer as the holding in Taylor was to the injured employee. Unless correctable, it might also be a violation of the due process rights of the employer. 156
The situation is not hopeless, however, as the rules of civil procedure provide
several possible solutions. First, it may be to the third-party tortfeasor's advantage to have the employer included as a party to the action. In that situation,
the third-party tortfeasor may be able to secure the employer's participation in
the worker's suit through Rule 1-014. As interpreted by the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 7 Rule 1-0 14 permits a defendant to implead a
third party as a means of raising the third party's comparative fault as a partial
defense.' 58 Although the defendant may raise the "Bartlett defense" without
impleading the employer, 59
' the New Mexico courts' construction of Rule 1-014
may afford a tortfeasor, named as a defendant in a worker's third-party action
for damages, the opportunity to bring the worker's employer into that action.
153. Taylor, 100 N.M. at 142, 667 P.2d at 449 (Payne, J., dissenting).
154. See Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 104-05, 370 P.2d 816, 820 (1962), (citing Reed
v. Stryon, 69 N.M. 262, 267, 365 P.2d 912, 915 (1961)). See also Transportation Indem. Co. v. Garcia,
89 N.M. 342, 345, 552 P.2d 473, 476 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976).
155. Because the only cause of action against an employer by an insured worker is under the Workers'
Compensation Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1987), the worker cannot name the employer
as a defendant in his action against a third-party tortfeasor.
156. "'it is fundamental to say that due process requires notice and hearing so that those who are to be
bound or affected by a judgment may have their day in court." City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M.
428, 435, 379 P.2d 73, 77 (1962).
157. 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
158. Id. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355.
159. Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 261, 731 P.2d 955, 957 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied., 105 N.M.
230, 731 P.2d 373 (1987).
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This option, when exercised, makes the employer a party to the worker's thirdparty action, and thus provides the employer with an opportunity to participate
in the action which will determine its percentage of fault.
For two reasons," 6 however, Rule 1-014 cannot provide a complete solution
to the procedural problem created by Section 52-1-10.1. First, Rule 1-0 14 impleader may be unavailable against an employer who is immune from liability
6
vis-a-vis the injured worker-plaintiff. ' Second, even if an employer can be
impleaded, Rule 1-014 places the decision to do so entirely in the hands of the
third-party tortfeasor, not the injured worker. The worker, who wants the employer to be a party so that it will be bound to the findings attributing fault
6 2 to
the employer.
the employer, cannot institute the third-party action against
Rule 1-024 may provide an alternative, albeit limited, solution. Rule 1-024
permits persons not named as parties to a lawsuit to intervene in that lawsuit
under certain circumstances.' 63 Although it is unlikely that an employer can
intervene as a matter of right in the worker's suit against the third-party tortfeasor, M the employer most likely will meet the criteria for permissive intervention. 6' 5
There is no guarantee, however, that the court will grant an employer's request
to intervene in a worker's action against a third-party tortfeasor for damages.
Moreover, even with Rule 1-024 at its disposal, an employer may choose not
to intervene and instead simply observe the action as an interested, but not
involved, bystander. Where the worker proceeds with his lawsuit against a thirdparty tortfeasor and the employer is not impleaded and does not intervene, the
question remains whether the determination of the employer's fault found in that
160. A third reason exists when the worker's action is in federal court. The Tenth Circuit, in Hefley v.
Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983), rejected the use of FED. R. Ci. P. 14 to implead a thirdparty solely on the basis that the third-party might be partially responsible for plaintiff's injuries under
principles of several liability.
161. Some doubt exists as to whether Rule 1-014, as construed by the court in Tipton, is available
against an employer. In Wilson v. Gillis, the court held that a tortfeasor who had settled with the plaintiff
could not be joined as a third-party defendant because he could not, after settlement, be liable to the
plaintiff. 105 N.M. at 266, 731 P.2d at 958. Wilson might be construed to bar a third-party tortfeasor's
use of Rule 1-014 to implead the employer because the employer also cannot be liable directly to the
plaintiff-injured worker. On the other hand, the rationale of Wilson may be limited to cases involving
settling tortfeasors, because the court's primary concern was to encourage settlement. Id.
162. See supra note 155. In addition, because only a "defending party" may implead a third-party
defendant, SCRA 1986, 1-014(A), the plaintiff cannot use Rule 1-014 to bring the employer into the action
unless the third party tortfeasor asserts a counterclaim against him. See SCRA 1986, 1-014(B).
163. SCRA 1986, 1-024.
164. The employer is not bound to the jury's determination that the employer is at fault if the employer
is not a party to the action between the worker and the third-party tortfeasor, even under the new collateral
estoppel rule recently adopted by the supreme court in Silva v. Stale, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
It is unlikely, therefore, that the employer's fight to reimbursement will be impaired or impeded by his
absence. Under these circumstances, there is no right to intervene. See SCRA 1986, 1-024(A). The employer
might claim a fight to intervene under the theory that, if the worker loses the suit against the tortfeasor,
there would be no fund from which the employer could seek reimbursement. This argument is unlikely to
suffice, because Rule 1-024(A) allows intervention only when an existing party does not adequately represent
the intervenor's interest, id.; the worker normally will do so.
165. Permissive intervention, allowed in the discretion of the court, is authorized whenever the "applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." SCRA 1986,
1-024(B). There is no question but that the employer's reimbursement rights are intimately connected to
questions relevant to the worker's tort claim and the tortfeasor's defenses.
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action can be applied against the employer to reduce the amount to which it is
entitled to be reimbursed.
The answer is no. New Mexico now applies the "modern rule" of collateral
estoppel in some situations where the parties to the two lawsuits are not the
same."6 Even this new formulation of the doctrine precludes the application of
collateral estoppel against a person, such as the employer, who was not a party
to the prior action or in privity with a67party to that action between the injured
worker and the third-party tortfeasor.1
Given these difficulties, Rule 1-019 provides perhaps the best solution to the
procedural problem occasioned by Section 52-1-10.1. Rule 1-019 provides that
a person should be joined as a party to an action if his absence would "leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."" 6 If the employer is not made a party, the employer will not be bound by
9
the percentage of fault attributed to it by the factfinder. 16
In a subsequent suit,
therefore, the employer might seek full reimbursement from the injured worker
despite a finding in the first trial that the employer was at fault, with a resulting
diminution in the amount of the worker's judgment against the third-party tortfeasor. This possibility of different determinations of the amount that the employee is to reimburse the employer provides a sufficient basis for declaring the
employer to be a person to be joined, if feasible, in the initial action. 7'
Rule 1-019 is not a perfect solution. For example, if the employer is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, Rule 1-019 is not available to bring the
employer into the worker's third-party action. 7' This difficulty, however, should
166. Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
167. "Fundamental fairness requires that the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate [in the prior proceeding.]" Id. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382. It is equally unlikely that
the employer would be able to use collateral estoppel against the worker or third-party tortfeasor in any
subsequent action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) ("where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action . . . a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral
estoppel."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §29(3) (1982).
168. SCRA 1986, 1-019(A)(2). The rule also requires that the party to be joined "claims an interest
relating to the subject of the [pending] action." Id. The employer who asserts a right to reimbursement
from the proceeds of the suit obviously meets this requirement.
169. See supra note 164.
170. Herrera v. Springer Corp., 85 N.M. 6, 508 P.2d 1303 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d
1072 (1973), is not to the contrary. There, the court of appeals held that the employer's insurance company
was not an indispensable party to the worker's suit against a third party. Finding that the employer's carrier
is not indispensable under Rule 1-019(B) does not preclude a finding that the employer or its carrier is a
party to be joined if feasible under Rule 1-019(A). See. e.g., Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist.,
91 N.M. 398, 401, 575 P.2d 88, 91 (1977). Moreover, at the time the court decided Herrera, the substantive
law was different than it now is; then the employer was entitled to complete reimbursement instead of
reimbursement reduced by the percentage of fault found in the action by the worker against the third-party
tortfeasor. With a right to full reimbursement, there was no possibility that the worker would be subject
to different findings affecting the amount of the reimbursement, as exists under current law. Cf. Continental
Casualty Co. v. Wueschinski, 95 N.M. 733, 625 P.2d 1250 (Ct. App. 1981) (worker is an "indispensable"
party to action by employer's carrier against third-party tortfeasor).
171. Rule 1-019(B) provides that when a person who should be joined if feasible "cannot be made a
party," the court should determine whether to proceed in the absence of the person, or to dismiss the action.
SCRA 1986, 1-019(B). A person cannot be a party if the person's presence would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, the person is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum, or venue of the action would
be inappropriate if the person is joined. See generally 3A J.MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. 19.04
(1987) (construing identically-worded Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)).
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not arise with much frequency. In state court, subject matter jurisdiction almost
never will be a problem.' 72 Similarly, when the employee is a New Mexico
resident injured in New Mexico, the long-arm jurisdiction of the New Mexico
73
courts normally will provide personal jurisdiction over the employer.' Only
when a resident worker sues the third-party in a state other than New Mexico
will there be a significant likelihood that personal jurisdiction over the employer
may be absent and joinder impossible. In this small class of cases, the absence
of personal jurisdiction will preclude the use of Rule 1-019 to bring the employer
into the worker's third-party lawsuit. In these instances, the court should invite
the employer to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 and should proceed with the case
even if the employer is not a party.'74
In short, existing procedural rules can adapt to the new substantive rights
established by Section 52-1-10.1. When an injured worker brings an action
against a third-party tortfeasor, either the employer will intervene pursuant to
Rule 1-024, the defendant will implead the employer under Rule 1-014, or the
court 7 will join the employer as a party pursuant to Rule 1-019. Unable to
legislate procedural statutes, 76 the Legislature adjusted the employer's substantive right to reimbursement, confident that existing procedural devices would
effectuate the goal of efficient resolution of an employer's reimbursement rights
in an action brought by a worker against a third-party tortfeasor.
XII. CONCLUSION
The drafters of Chapter 141 attempted a multifaceted task: to codify many of
the existing principles of comparative fault and several liability; to resolve several
problems which had arisen under these judicially-created doctrines; to reinstate
joint and several liability in certain limited situations; and to provide a framework
for the future solution of questions which will arise in this quickly changing area
of the law. Although far from perfect, the statute accomplishes many of the
172. New Mexico's district courts have subject matter jurisdiction "in all matters and causes not excepted
in Ithe] constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law."
N.M. Const. art. VI, section 13. There are only rare occasions where the district court will lack subject
matter jurisdiction if a person to be joined if feasible were joined. E.g., Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v.
Gatlin, 61 N.M. 58, 294 P.2d 628 (1956) (United States not subject'to suit in state court absent consent
of United States).
173. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (1978). The worker's action against the third-party tortfeasor and the
tortfeasor's theory supporting a Bartlett apportionment almost always will be based on a tort theory. Because
the "tortious act" required by the statute, id. §38-1-16(A)(3), is satisfied whenever the injury occurs in
this state, Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1983), the employer
of a worker injured in New Mexico normally will be subject to personal jurisdiction in this state.
174. Rule 1-019 authorizes the court to proceed in the absence of a person who should be joined but
who cannot be made a party. SCRA 1986, 1-019(B). New Mexico courts show no reluctance to proceed
in the absence of a party who should be joined, but cannot be, if the governing criteria do not clearly
mandate dismissal of the action. E.g., Methola v. County of Eddy, 96 N.M. 274, 629 P.2d 350 (Ct. App.
1981).
175. The court has the power to order the joinder of a person pursuant to Rule 1-0 19 even if no party
makes a motion seeking joinder. SCRA 1986, 1-021.
176. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); see generally,
Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The
Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407 (1985).
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drafters' goals. Properly construed and creatively applied, Chapter 141 should
provide the proper mix of certainty and flexibility which the drafters intended
by this limited statutory intervention into the development of the common law
of torts in New Mexico.
APPENDIX
A. Senate Bill 164-Original Version
B. New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association-Proposed Revision
C. Southwest Community Health Services-Proposed Revision
D. Southwest Community Health Services Proposal With Further Revisions:
Tentative Draft
E. New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association-Proposal with Further Revisions
and Comments
F. Proposed Draft Reflecting Tentative Agreement Of All Drafters-Subject To
Final Mark Up Session
G. Proposed Statute Following Final Mark Up Session: Amended SB 164
H. Letter From Mr. Hall to Mr. Bond
I.

N.M. Laws 1987, Chapter 141

A.
SENATE BILL 164-ORIGINAL VERSION
Judiciary Committee
Senate Bill
38th LEGISLATURE-STATE OF NEW MEXICO-FIRST SESSION, 1987
INTRODUCED BY
AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS: PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SEVERAL LIABILITY; REPEALING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NMSA
1978. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO:
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Section 1. SEVERAL LIABILITY.A. In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies,
the liability of any defendant shall be several and not joint. Where several liability
applies, any defendant shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar
amount awarded as damages to any plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such
defendant's amount at fault to the amount at fault attributed to all persons,
including plaintiffs, defendants and persons not party to the action.
B. No defendant in an action described in Subsection A of this section shall
be entitled to contribution from any other person. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to affect or impair any right of indemnity or contribution arising
out of any contract or agreement or any right of indemnity otherwise provided
by law.
C. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly, any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law.
Nothing in this section alters legal requirements of proximate cause.
D. In civil actions, a claimant's release of one person liable for an injury,
whether before or after judgment, does not discharge other liable persons unless
the release so provides.
Section 2. REPEAL.-Sections 41-3-1 through 41-3-8 NMSA 1978 (begin
Laws 1947, Chapter 121, Sections 1 through 6, 8 and 9) are repealed.
B.
NEW MEXICO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION-PROPOSED
REVISION
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
Section 1. PURPOSE
The legislature recognizes that the courts have abolished the doctrine of
joint and several liability in certain cases in which it had previously existed. The
purpose of this Act is to confirm that abolition of joint and several liability in
certain circumstances, and to legislatively reinstate the doctrine in other circumstances.
Section 2.
A. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more
persons whose combined negligence contributed to cause an indivisible injury
to another person, is abolished, except as provided in subsection C. The liability
of any such negligent tortfeasors shall be several.
B. Where this Act provided for several liability, any defendant who establishes that the negligence of another person is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injury shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as
damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's amount of
negligence to the amount of causal negligence proven by such defendant to be
attributable to all negligent persons.
C. The provisions of subsection A shall not apply to:
1) any cause of action in which the plaintiff is not guilty of comparative
negligence proximately contributing to the injury;
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2) any persons who acted in concert when their combined negligence
contributed to cause an indivisible injury to another person;
3) any persons whose relationship to each other makes one person vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of another person;
4) any person whose relationship to each other is such that the liability
of one negligent person consists of the negligent failure of that person to guard
against or prevent the negligent conduct of the other person;
5) any person who undertakes the duty to render assistance or exercise
care to minimize or prevent injury to persons already injured or in danger of
injury from any cause
6) any case in which the factfinder imposes liability on any tortfeasor
on the basis of any theory other than negligence.
D. In all cases other than those described in subsection A, the doctrine of
joint and several liability shall apply, as at common law prior to its partial
abrogation by the courts of New Mexico.
E. In any action to which subsections A and B apply, upon motion of a
party not more than one year after judgment is entered, the court shall determine
whether all or part of a person's proportionate share of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages is uncollectible from that person. If the court determines
that the amount is uncollectible, the court shall reallocate any uncollectible
amount among the other parties, including a negligent plaintiff, according to
their respective ratios of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless
subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the plaintiff.
Section 3.
Section 41-3-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121, Section 2, as
amended) is amended to read:
(repeat A, B, and C of Uniform Contrib. Among Tortfeasors Act)
D. A pro rata share shall be that portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's
percentage of fault to the total percentage of fault attributed to all joint tortfeasors.
Section 4.
Section 52-1-56 NMSA is amended to read:
(take care of Taylor v. Delgarno problem)
C.
SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES-PROPOSED
REVISION
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
Section 1. SEVERAL LIABILITY.A. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more
defendants whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished, except as provided in subsection C. The liability of any such defendants
shall be several.
B. Where this act provides for several liability, any defendant who estab-
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lishes that the fault of another person, including plaintiffs, defendants or persons
not parties to the action, is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, shall be
liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to
any plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's amount at fault to the
amount at fault attributed to all persons.
C. The provisions of subsection A shall not apply:
(1) To any person or persons whose conduct is found malicious, willful
or wanton and who intentionally acted to inflict a specific injury upon any
plaintiff;
(2) To any persons whose relationship to each other would make one
person liable for the acts of the other in accordance with the doctrine of
respondeat superior or any other theory which imposes vicarious liability
upon one person for the conduct of another;
(3) In product liability actions, to that portion of the total liability attributed to the persons strictly liable because of the manufacture, distribution
or sale of the defective product;
(4) To any person or persons whose conduct is found proximately to have
caused an injury to a plaintiff where it is reasonably foreseeable that the
future conduct of another person proximately will cause a separate injury
to the plaintiff, and such other person acts in such a manner as proximately
to cause the reasonably foreseen separate injury.
D. In all cases described in subsection C, the doctrine of joint and several
liability shall apply.
E. The enumeration of certain exceptions in subsection C to the rule stated
in subsection A is not exclusive, and nothing in this Act shall foreclose judicial
recognition and development of additional parties or claims which are not subject
to the doctrine of several liability as provided in subsection A.
F. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right
of indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract or agreement or any
right of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
G. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly, any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law.
Nothing in this section alters legal requirements of proximate cause.
Section 2. CONTRIBUTION: "PRO RATA" DEFINED.Section 41-3-2 NMSA (being laws 1947, Chapter 121, Section 2, as
amended) is amended to read:
D. A pro rata share is that portion of the total dollar amount awardedas
damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint torifeasor's
percentage offault to the total percentage offault attributedto all joint tortfeasors.
Section 3.
Section 52-1-56 NMSA (1978) hereby is amended as follows:
C. The right of any workman, or, in the case of his death, of those entitled
to receive payment or damages for injuries occasioned to him by the negligence
or wrong of any person other than the employer or any other employee, shall
not be affected by the Workman's Compensation Act, but he or they, as the case
may be, shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages therefore
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and also claim compensation from the employer, and in such case the receipt of
compensation from the employer shall operate as an assignment to the employer,
his or its insurer, guarantor or surety, as the case may be of any cause of action,
only to the extent of such payment by the employer to the workman for compensation, surgical, medical, osteopathic, chiropractic, and hospital services and
medicine exceed the proportionateshare of damages attributed to the employer
in any action which the workman or his legal representative or others may have
against any other party for injuries or death.
Section 4. APPLICATION.This Act shall apply to all civil actions filed after the effective date of this
statute.
D.
SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES PROPOSAL WITH
FURTHER REVISIONS: TENTATIVE DRAFT
Section 1. (A) In any civil action to which the doctrine of comparative fault
applies, the doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more
defendants whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff, is abolished, except as provided in subsection C. The liability of any such defendants
shall be several.
(B) Where this Act provides for several liability, any defendant shall be liable
only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to any
plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's amount at fault to the
amount at fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants, and
persons not party to the action.
(C) The provisions of subsection A shall not apply:
(1) to any person or persons whose conduct is found to be malicious, willful
or wanton and who intentionally acted to inflict a specific injury upon any
plaintiff;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other is otherwise covered
by the doctrine of respondeat superior or any other theory which imposes vicarious liability upon one person for the conduct of another;
(3) in product liability actions to that portion of the total liability attributed
to the persons strictly liable because of the manufacture, distribution and sale
of the defective product.
(D) In all cases described by subsection C, the doctrine imposing joint and
several liability shall apply.
(E) No defendant in an action described in subsection (A) shall be entitled to
contribution from any other person. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to affect or impair any right of indemnity or contribution arising out of any
contract or agreement or any right of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
(F) Nothing in this section creates or recognized, either explicitly or impliedly,
any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law. Nothing
in this section alters legal requirements of proximate cause.
Section 2. Section 41-3-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121, Section 2, as amended) is amended to read:
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D. A pro rata share shall be that portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's
percentage offault to the total percentage of fault attributedto all joint tortfeasors.
Section 3. Section 52-1-56 NMSA (1978) is hereby amended as follows:
C. The right of any workman, or, in case of his death, of those entitled to
receive payment or damages for injuries occasioned to him by the negligence
or wrong of any person other than the employer or any other employee of the
employer, including a management or supervisory employee, shall not be affected
by the Workman's Compensation Act, but he or they, as the case may be, shall
not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages therefore and also claim
compensation from the employer, and in such case the receipt of compensation
from the employer shall operate as an assignment to the employer, his or its
insurer, guarantor or surety, as the case may be of any cause of action, only to
the extent of such payment by the employer to the workman for compensation,
surgical, medical, osteopathic, chiropractic, and hospital services and medicine
exceed the proportionateshare of damages attributed to the employer in any
action which the workman or his legal representative or others may have against
any other party for injuries or death.
E.
NEW MEXICO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION-PROPOSAL WITH
FURTHER CHANGES AND COMMENTS
AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SEVERAL LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING
FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION; PROVIDING FOR EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS OF PROCEEDS
OF LAWSUITS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
SECTION 1. SEVERAL LIABILITYA. In any civil action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the
doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more tortfeasors whose
conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except as
provided in subsection C. The liability of any such defendants shall be several.
B. In civil actions to which subsection A applies, any defendant who establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury shall
be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to
the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's amount at fault to the
amount at fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants, and
persons not party to the action.
C. The provisions of subsection A shall not apply:
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a. To any person or persons whose conduct is found to be malicious, willful
or wanton, or who acted with the intention of inflicting injury upon any person;
b. To any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person
liable for the acts of the other in accordance with the doctrine of respondeat
superior or any other theory or agreement which imposes vicarious liability on
one person for the conduct of another;
c. In product liability actions, to that portion of the total liability attributed
to the persons strictly liable because of the manufacture, distribution or sale of
the defective product;
d. In actions in which the damages to the plaintiff can be apportioned among
those persons whose fault contributed to the plaintiff's damages on the basis that
distinct harms were caused to the plaintiff by the fault of each person or where
there is another reasonable basis for determining the probable causal contribution
of each person's fault.
e. To other persons or actions to which the doctrine of several liability
should not apply because it is inimical to the proper development of the common
law. In all cases described in this subsection, the doctrine imposing joint and
several liability shall apply.
D. No defendant in an action described in subsection A shall be entitled to
contribution from any other person, nor shall such defendant be entitled to reduce
the dollar damages determined by the factfinder to be owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff in accordance with subsection B by any amount that the plaintiff
has recovered from any other person whose fault may have also proximately
caused injury to the plaintiff.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right of
indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract of agreement or any right
of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
E. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly,
any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law. Nothing
in this section alters legal requirements of proximate cause.
F. In all actions not expressly subject to this act, the courts shall continue to
apply, to develop and to modify the common law of this state, including the
common law doctrines of several liability and joint and several liability.
Section 2. Section 41-3-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121, Section 2, as amended) is amended to read:
D. A pro rata share shall be that portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint torfeasor's
percentage offault to the total percentage of fault attributedto alljoint torifeasors.
Section 3.
Notwithstanding anything in the Workers' Compensation Law to the contrary,
if the fault of the worker's employer or those from whom the employer is legally
responsible, other than the injured worker, is found to have contributed to the
worker's injury, the employer's right to reimbursement from the proceeds of the
worker's recovery in any action against any tortfeasor shall be diminished by
the percentage of fault, if any, attributed to the employer or those for whom the
employer is responsible, other than the injured worker.
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ALTERNATIVE SEC. 3 LANGUAGE
If any employer, person, or other entity is entitled to subrogation, reimbursement, or repayment for amounts previously paid to a person who brings suit for
injury caused by the tortious conduct of another person, then the employer's or
other person's or entity's right to recover shall be reduced by the proportionate
share of fault attributed to the employer or other person or entity in the suit
brought against the other person.
Section 4. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The affirmative defense of fault of others shall apply only to tortfeasors whose
statute of limitations has not lapsed at the time the defense is raised.
EFFECTIVE DATE
This Act shall apply to all civil actions initially filed on and after the effective
date of this Act.

F.
PROPOSED DRAFT REFLECTING TENTATIVE AGREEMENT OF ALL
DRAFTERS-SUBJECT TO FINAL MARK UP SESSION
AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SEVERAL LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING
FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION; PROVIDING FOR EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS OF PROCEEDS
OF LAWSUITS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
SECTION 1. SEVERAL LIABILITY.
A. In any civil action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the
doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more tortfeasors whose
conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except as
otherwise provided hereafter. The liability of any such defendants shall be several.
B. In civil actions to which subsection A applies, any defendant who establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury shall
be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to
the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault to the total fault
attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants, and persons not party
to the action.
C. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
1. To any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury
upon any person;
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2. To any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person
vicariously liable for the acts of the other;
3. In product liability actions, to that portion of the total liability attributed
to the persons strictly liable because of the manufacture, distribution or sale of
the defective product.
D. Where a plaintiff sustains damage as the result of fault of more than one
person which can be causally apportioned on the basis that distinct harms were
caused to the plaintiff, the fault of each of the persons proximately causing one
harm shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately causing other
distinct harms. Each person is severally liable only for the distinct harm which
that person proximately caused, except that existing principles of proximate cause
shall continue to apply.
E. In all actions not specifically covered by this section, the courts may make
further applications of or exclusions from the doctrines of several liability and
joint and several liability.
F. No defendant in an action described in subsection A shall be entitled to
contribution from any other person, nor shall such defendant be entitled to reduce
the dollar damages determined by the factfinder to be owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff in accordance with subsection B by any amount that the plaintiff
has recovered from any other person whose fault may have also proximately
caused injury to the plaintiff.
G. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right of
indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract of agreement or any right
of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
H. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly,
any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law. Nothing
in this section alters legal requirements of proximate cause.
SECTION 2. Section 41-3-2 N.M.S.A. 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121,
Section 2, as amended) is amended to read:
D. A pro rata share shall be the portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's
percentage of fault to the total percentage offault attributedto all joint torfeasors.
SECTION 3. ALLOCATION OF FAULT-REIMBURSEMENT
Notwithstanding anything in the Workers' Compensation Law to the contrary,
if the fault of the worker's employer or those for whom the employer is legally
responsible, other than the injured worker, is found to have proximately caused
the worker's injury, the employer's right to reimbursement from the proceeds
of the worker's recovery in any action against any tortfeasor shall be diminished
by the percentage of fault, if any, attributed to the employer or those for whom
the employer is responsible, other than the injured worker.
SECTION 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This act shall apply to all civil actions initially filed on and after July 1, 1987.
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G.
PROPOSED STATUTE FOLLOWING FINAL MARK UP SESSION:
AMENDED SB 164
State of New Mexico
House of Representatives
THIRTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE
FIRST SESSION

SB 164,a

March 15, 1987

Mr. Speaker:
Your JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, to whom has been referred
SENATE BILL 164
has had it under consideration and reports same with recommendation that it DO
PASS, amended as follows:
1. On page 1, line 11, after the semicolon strike the remainder of the line
and strike all of line 12. Insert in lieu thereof the following:
"PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SEVERAL LIABILITY
IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING FOR COMPARATIVE
CONTRIBUTION; PROVIDING FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
PROCEEDS OF LAWSUITS.".
2. On page 1, strike all of lines 15 through 25 and on page 2, strike all of
lines 1 through 12. Insert in lieu thereof the following:
"Section 1. [NEW MATERIAL] SEVERAL LIABILITY.A. In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault
applies, the doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more
wrongdoers whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is
abolished except as otherwise provided hereafter. The liability of any such
defendants shall be several.
B. In causes of action to which several liability applies, any defendant
who establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injury shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault
to the total fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants
and persons not party to the action.
C. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(I) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting
injury or damage;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one
person vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion
of the total liability attributed to those persons;
(3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a
defective product, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to
those persons; or
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(4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a
sound basis in public policy.
D. Where a plaintiff sustains damage as the result of fault of more than
one person which can be causally apportioned on the basis that distinct harms
were caused to the plaintiff, the fault of each of the persons proximately
causing one harm shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately
causing other distinct harms. Each person is severally liable only for the
distinct harm which that person proximately caused.
E. No defendant who is severally liable shall be entitled to contribution
from any other person, nor shall such defendant be entitled to reduce the
dollar damages determined by the factfinder to be owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff in accordance with Subsection B of this section by any amount
that the plaintiff has recovered from any other person whose fault may have
also proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.
F. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right
of indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract of agreement or any
right or indemnity otherwise provided by law.
G. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly, any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by
law. Nothing in this section alters the doctrine of proximate cause.
Section 2. [NEW MATERIAL] DEFINITION.-As used in this act, "person" means any individual or entity or any kind whatsoever.
Section 3. Section 41-3-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121,
Section 2) is amended to read:
"41-3-2. RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION-ACCRUAL-PRO RATA
SHARE.[(I)] A. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
[(2)] B. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for
contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
[(3)] C. A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured
person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
D. A pro ratashare shall be theportion of the totaldollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of each joint tortfeasor's
percentage of fault to the total percentage of fault attributed to all joint
torifeasors."
Section 4. [NEW MATERIAL] ALLOCATION FAULT-REIMBURSEMENT.-Notwithstanding anything in the worker's compensation law to
the contrary, if the fault of the worker's employer or those for whom the
employer is legally responsible, other than the injured worker, is found to
have proximately caused the worker's injury, the employer's right to reimbursement from the proceeds of the worker's recovery in any action against
any wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of fault, if any, attributed to the employer or those for whom the employer is responsible,
other than the injured worker.
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Section 5. APPLICABILITY.-This act shall apply to all civil actions
initially filed on and after July I, 1987."
Respectfully Submitted,

Thomas P. Foy, Chairman
Adopted

Not Adopted
(Chief Clerk)

(Chief Clerk)
Date

The roll call vote was 8 For, I Against
Yes: 8
No: McSorley
Excused: Knowles, R. Sanchez, Vargas
Absent: None

H.
LETER FROM MR. HALL TO MR. BOND
March 26, 1987
Frank H. Bond, Esq.
Legislative Aide to
Governor Garrey Carruthers
Post Office Box 2476
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504
Re: Senate Bill 164
Dear Mr. Bond:
As one who was involved in the technical drafting of SD 164, 1 am writing to
explain the substantive effect of that legislation, and briefly to review its background.
In Scott v. Rizzo, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the rule of comparative
negligence and held that a plaintiff suing in negligence no longer is totally barred
from recovery because of his own contributory fault. One year later, in Bartlett
v. New Mexico Welding Supply Inc., the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled
that joint and several liability is not to be retained under the New Mexico system
of pure comparative negligence. The court reasoned that the pure form of comparative negligence adopted in Scott v. Rizzo apportions liability in direct pro-
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portion to fault in all cases, and as a result, a defendant's liability is governed
by the extent of his fault.
SB 164 represents the efforts of a coalition of business interests, the New Mexico
Trial Lawyers Association and tort experts from the University of New Mexico
Law School to codify the application of several liability while preserving certain
areas for the application of joint and several liability. It is my judgment, and
the judgment of others who participated in the drafting process, that the final
bill passed by both houses of the legislature accomplishes these objectives. The
remainder of this letter is a general explanation of each provision of the bill.
Section 1, paragraph A sets forth the general principle that, in any cause of
action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the liability of all
persons whose conduct proximately caused the injury is several, not joint and
several. As defined in paragraph B, several liability means that the defendant
found to be at fault only is liable for that portion of the total amount of damages
equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault to the total fault attributed to all
persons. Under this formulation, if ajury awards the plaintiff $10,000 in damages
and finds Defendant I to be 25% at fault and Defendant 2 to be 60% at fault,
Defendant I is responsible for paying plaintiff $2,500, Defendant 2 must pay
$6,000, and the remaining 15% of the damage award is to be borne by the
Plaintiff.
Section 1, paragraph C retains the doctrine of joint and several liability in three
specific situations: (1) to persons who intentionally injure the plaintiff; (2) to
persons vicariously responsible for the acts of another (e.g. an employer for its
employee); and (3) among persons held strictly liable for the manufacture and
sale of a defective product. Subparagraph 4 leaves open to the courts the possibility of applying joint and several liability to other situations justified by sound
public policy.
Paragraph D embodies the idea that each person is liable only for the harm which
he or she has caused. If a plaintiff is injured by the acts of two or more defendants,
each is responsible only for the harm which that defendant proximately caused.
Paragraphs E and F amplify this notion by removing the basis for contribution
or indemnity among defendants in the absence of a contract or rights otherwise
provided by law. These paragraphs also encourage settlement in negligent cases
by preventing parties from seeking to alter a pre-trial settlement agreement in
light of the allocation of actual fault determined at trial. Paragraph G of Section
1, and Section 2, are self-explanatory.
Section 3 amends the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to define "pro rata
share" in a manner consistent with the definition of several liability explained
above. Finally, Section 4 provides that when an employer is found to be responsible for a worker's job-related injury, the employer's right to reimbursement
from the proceeds of the worker's recovery in an action brought against a
wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of the employer's fault.
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I hope that this letter has served to explain the general provisions of Senate Bill
164. Should you have any additional questions concerning this bill, please feel
free to contact me.
Sincerely,
RODEY, DICKASON, SLOAN, AKIN & ROBB, P.A.
BY
Bruce Hall
I.
N.M. LAWS 1987, CHAPTER 141
AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SEVERAL LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING
FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION; PROVIDING FOR EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS OF LAWSUITS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
Section 1. SEVERAL LIABILITY.A. In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies,
the doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more wrongdoers
whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except
as otherwise provided hereafter. The liability of any such defendants shall be
several.
B. In causes of action to which several liability applies, any defendant who
establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury
shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages
to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault to the total fault
attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants and persons not party
to the action.
C. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(1) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury
or damage;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person
vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the total
liability attributed to those persons;
(3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective
product, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons;
or
(4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a sound
basis in public policy.
D. Where a plaintiff sustains damage as the result of fault or [of] more than
one person which can be causally apportioned on the basis that distinct harms
were caused to the plaintiff, the fault of each of the persons proximately causing
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one harm shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately causing other
distinct harms. Each person is severally liable only for the distinct harm which
that person proximately caused.
E. No defendant who is severally liable shall be entitled to contribution from
any other person, not [nor] shall such defendant be entitled to reduce the dollar
damages determined by the factfinder to be owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
in accordance with subsection B of this action by any amount that the plaintiff
has recovered from any other person whose fault may have also proximately
caused injury to the plaintiff.
F. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right of
indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract or agreement or any right
of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
G. Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly,
any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law. Nothing
in this section alters the doctrine of proximate cause.
Section 2. DEFINITION.-As used in this act, "person" means any individual
or entity of any kind whatsoever.
Section 3. Section 41-3-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1947, Chapter 121, Section 2) is amended to read:
"41-3-2. RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION-ACCRUAL-PRO RATA SHARE.A. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
B. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution
until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than
his pro rata share thereof.
C. A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person
is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability
to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
D. A pro rata share shall be the portion of the total dollar amount awarded
as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ration [ratio] of each joint tortfeasor's percentage of fault to the total percentage of fault attributed to all joint
tortfeasirs.
Section 4. ALLOCATION OF FAULT -REIMBURSEMENT.notwithstanding anything in the worker's compensation law to the contrary, if
the fault of the worker's employer or those for whom the employer is legally
responsible, other than the injured worker, is found to have proximately caused
the worker's injury, the employer's right to reimbursement from the proceeds
of the worker's recovery in any action against any wrongdoer shall be diminished
by the percentage of fault, if any, attributed to the employer or those for whom
the employer is responsible, other than the injured worker.
Section 5. APPLICABILITY.-This act shall apply to all civil actions initially
filed on and after July 1, 1987.

